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We live in a service economy, but the extent of development of service employ-
ment diﬀers across developed countries. This paper assesses the role of structural
factors and institutions in explaining the common patterns and main diﬀerences in
the recent expansion of service employment in OECD countries. It ﬁnds that GDP
per capita, the size of the government sector and the extent of urbanization are posi-
tively associated with the service employment share. However, the evidence suggests
that laws and institutions such as product market regulations, unions and more co-
ordinated wage-setting systems are hampering the expansion of service employment.
Keywords: Service Industries, Product and Labor Market Regulations, Employ-
ment, Structural Change
JEL Classiﬁcation: J21, L80, L51.
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During the last century, service industries have absorbed a continuously increasing
share of the labour force in the OECD countries, while agricultural activities have lost
weight dramatically. Thus, the growth of the service employment share stands out as
a prominent regularity of the growth process of modern economies. However, there are
still remarkable diﬀerences in the relative sizes of the service employment share across
countries with similar income per capita. For instance, Italy and Germany had service
employment shares barely exceeding 60 per cent in the second half of the 1990s, more
than 10 percentage points lower than in the US, Australia or Canada. In the light of
these diﬀerences, it is not surprising then that the lack of dynamism in the service sector
in Europe is often blamed as one of the key elements in explaining the poor employment
performance of the 1980s and 1990s.
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, it extends previous literature on the determi-
nants of service employment across developed economies. A special emphasis is placed
on the sources of cross-country variation in the size of the service sector within this
relatively homogeneous group of countries. Second, it assesses the role of product and
labour market institutions in determining the sectoral structure of modern economies.
While the role of institutions in the determination of labour market aggregates such as
employment or unemployment has been extensively studied, their eﬀects on the sectoral
structure of the economy have been largely ignored in the literature. Gordon (1997)
suggests that minimum wages and wage compression possibly induced by unions in Eu-
rope is cutting back jobs in the lower tail of the skill distribution within the service
sector. On the product market side of the institutional spectrum, Messina (2003) shows
that economy-wide product market regulations which restrain entry and mobility at the
ﬁrm level have asymmetric eﬀects on the sectoral structure of the economy, hindering
the “natural” pattern of sectoral reallocation of labour, and thus obstructing the devel-
opment of the service sector. This paper assesses the empirical relevance of these two
hypotheses.
The analysis, based on a panel of 27 OECD countries observed within the 1970-1998
period, conﬁrms the importance of structural factors in the determination of service em-
ployment. Across most speciﬁcations, it is found that GDP per capita, the productivity
gap of services with respect to manufacturing, the size of the public sector and the degree
of urbanization have a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the service employ-
ment share. On the contrary, the results stress important institutional constraints to
the development of service employment. Stringent barriers to the creation of new ﬁrms
due to administrative burdens to business startups and more unionized and coordinated
wage-setting structures within a country are associated with a lower service employment
share. Regarding product market regulations, this result is in line with theoretical in-
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March 2004sights that suggest that product market regulations hinder the development of sectors
whose demand is income elastic, such as Financial and Business Services or Social and
Personal Services. This is partially supported in an empirical analysis of the determi-
nants of four service branches. The disaggregated analysis also uncovers that the main
negative eﬀects of unions and coordinated wage-setting structures falls on Retail and
Wholesale Trade. Taking into account that this sector is intensive in low skill labour,
this can be read as supportive evidence that more unionized labour markets where bar-
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During the last century, service industries have absorbed a continuously increasing share
of the labour force in the OECD countries, while agricultural activities have lost weight
dramatically. Thus, the growth of the service employment share stands out as a promi-
nent regularity of the growth process of modern economies. However, there are still
remarkable diﬀerences in the relative sizes of the service employment share across coun-
tries with similar income per capita. For instance, Italy and Germany had service em-
ployment shares barely exceeding 60 per cent in the second half of the 1990s, more than
10 percentage points lower than in the US, Australia or Canada. In the light of these
diﬀerences, it is not surprising then that the lack of dynamism in the service sector in
Europe is often blamed as one of the key elements in explaining the poor employment
performance of the 1980s and 1990s.1
Most empirical and theoretical studies have concentrated on documenting the cross-
country regularities in the process of structural change. These empirical analyses date
back to the pioneering studies of Clark (1957) and Kuznets (1966), who described the
main features of the process of sectoral reallocation of resources that accompanies the
growth of modern economies. A key feature of the subsequent literature has been to
disentangle wether the forces behind the growth of service employment are related to
demand factors as proposed by Clark (1957), or to the slow growth of service productiv-
ity as suggested by Baumol (1967).2 However, there is little emphasis on this literature
regarding potential sources of cross-country divergence in the sectoral allocation of re-
sources.
A vast empirical literature analyzes the eﬀects of institutions on unemployment, re-
lating the experience observed in diﬀerent countries to the role of labour market policies
(Scarpetta, 1996 and Nickell, 1997), their interaction with macroeconomic shocks (Blan-
chard and Wolfers, 2000) and demographic factors (Bertola et al., 2002; Jimeno and
Rodriguez-Palenzuela, 2002). Similarly, a growing literature relates institutional factors
to the employment rates observed across OECD countries (e.g. Nicoletti et al. 2000 and
Nickell and Nunziata, 2001).
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, it extends previous literature on the determi-
nants of service employment across developed economies. A special emphasis is placed
on the sources of cross-country variation in the size of the service sector within this
relatively homogeneous group of countries. Second, it assesses the role of product and
1For instance, Mr. A. Larsson, Director General of the Employment and Social Aﬀairs of the European
Commission stated during a speech at the LSE that “The real diﬀerence between Europe and the US
is employment in the services sector. The fact is that, if Europe had had the same employment in the
service sector as the US, there would be more than 30 million additional jobs in Europe.” The document
can be found at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg05/index_en.htm
2Fuchs (1968) examines the issue in detail. For a recent review of the facts see OECD (2000).
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Regarding the latter, Gordon (1997) suggests that minimum wages and wage compres-
sion possibly induced by unions in Europe is cutting back jobs in the lower tail of the skill
distribution within the service sector. On the product market side of the institutional
spectrum, Messina (2003) shows within a fairly standard general equilibrium model that
economy-wide product market regulations which restrain entry and mobility at the ﬁrm
l e v e lh a v ea s y m m e t r i ce ﬀects on the sectoral structure of the economy, hindering the
“natural” pattern of sectoral reallocation of labour, and thus obstructing the develop-
ment of the service sector. Although there is no evidence at the aggregate level of this
hypothesis, ﬁndings in Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) are in line with this hypothesis,
suggesting that more stringent zoning laws have hindered job creation in the retail sector
in France.
The analysis, based on a panel of 27 OECD countries observed within the 1970-1998
period, conﬁrms the importance of structural factors in the determination of service
employment. It is found that GDP per capita, the productivity gap of services with
respect to manufacturing, the size of the public sector and the degree of urbanization
have a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the service employment share. On
the contrary, the results stress important institutional constraints to the development of
service employment. Countries where the legislation aﬀecting product markets is more
stringent present a share of the workforce employed in service activities relatively low
when compared with similar but less regulated economies. The results are also consistent
with the view that the service sector is less dynamic in more unionized economies where
the wage-setting system is more coordinated. Distinguishing the analysis across four
service branches, it is found that unions play a stronger role in sectors intensive in low
skilled labour such as Wholesale and Retail trade, suggesting wage compression as a
channel through which unions might hamper the development of the service sector.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the main
factors that have been mentioned in the literature as determinants of the service employ-
ment share. Section 3 describes the empirical methodology and principal characteristics
of the data used, while Section 4 presents the main ﬁndings of the empirical analysis.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The Determinants of Service Employment
2.1 Income per Capita and Sectoral Structure
The ﬁrst aspect commonly mentioned in the literature as an engine of structural change
is associated with tastes. Clark (1957) argued that once a certain level of development is
achieved, modern societies would demand service activities more than proportionally as
8
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larger than one, the consumption and employment shares of services will increase with the
rise of living standards. The second aspect, ﬁrst put forward in Baumol (1967), highlights
supply side forces. In Baumol’s view, the main reason for explaining the growth of service
employment is the service productivity gap with respect to the manufacturing sector.
Baumol observed that measured productivity growth is actually much lower in service
industries than in manufacturing and therefore even if the real demand of services is
not growing, an increasing amount of resources is required for production in this sector.
This will be the case as long as service demand is suﬃciently price inelastic, since the
counterpart of service productivity growth lagging behind manufacturing productivity
would be a constant increase of service relative prices.
Both type of forces predict a positive association between income per capita and the
service employment share. However, they oﬀer little guidance with respect to the possible
sources of divergence in the service employment share across countries with similar in-
come per capita. In principle, there are no reasons to think that the preference structure
of the population in countries at similar stages of development should diﬀer, unless dif-
ferences in the distribution of income alter substantially the composition of ﬁnal demand
across countries. Similarly, technology ﬂows rapidly across national borders, such that
countries with similar income per capita should have a similar technology. Therefore, if
tastes or diﬀerentials in productivity growth are the main engines of structural change,
countries with similar income per capita should have a similar share of the labour force
engaged in the production of services.
Figure 1 correlates income per capita and the service employment share observed
every decade during the 20th and late 19th century for 14 OECD. The similarities in
the growth of service employment stand out from the ﬁgure, illustrating the common
features in the process of structural change. However, a closer look at the relationship
between income per capita and the service employment share also uncovers important
disparities across countries. Figure 2 shows the snapshot distribution of the service
employment share and GDP per capita across a larger sample of OECD countries in
the 90s. While the positive association between both variables is still evident, the graph
also shows remarkable diﬀerences across economies lying in similar income per capita
ranges. Take the Netherlands and Italy, for example. While the former employs 73% of
its labour force in service activities, in the latter the service employment share does not
exceed 60%. Something similar could be said about the relative underdevelopment of
the service sector in other countries in continental Europe, such as Germany or Austria,
when compared to Australia or Canada.
A ﬁnal aspect commonly mentioned in the literature as an engine of service employ-
ment growth is outsourcing. In support of this hypothesis, empirical evidence suggests
9
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the major OECD economies during the last decades.3 Some authors have proposed that
a lesser use of outsourcing by European ﬁrms might be behind the diﬀerence in the ser-
vice employment shares when compared to the US. However, this hypothesis has found
little empirical support when comparing German and US employment structures (Free-
man and Schettkat, 1999). Moreover, diﬀerences in ﬁrm’s outsourcing decisions across
countries should be considered endogenous, their sources possibly lying on institutional
aspects (which might aﬀect transaction costs for instance) which will be reviewed below.
2.2 Service Employment: the Sources of Cross-Country Diﬀerences
2.2.1 Trade specialization.
Resource endowments shape the patterns of international trade according to the Heckscher-
Ohlin theory. Countries relatively abundant in natural resources will then tend to spe-
cialize in the exports of agricultural and raw material goods, importing manufacturing
products and drawing resources from the manufacturing sector towards the primary
goods sector. However, as more resources are devoted to the production of primary
goods, the rise in the real exchange rate induced by the new pattern of trade might
trigger an expansion of the non-tradable sector (i.e. service sector). Thus, through the
so-called ”Dutch disease” phenomenon, countries with a larger endowment of natural
resources are expected to have an above average share of employment engaged in service
production.
Human capital is another resource that might well be a source of comparative advan-
tage. The service sector is characterized by a relatively skill intensive production when
compared to the manufacturing sector, even if some service branches such as restaurants
and hotels are intensive in low skill labour. In 1998, the ratio of university to non-
university workers engaged in service industries was 0.24, almost three times larger than
in the manufacturing sector (OECD, 2000). If the average level of skills demanded is
higher in services, human capital accumulation should be accompanied by an expansion
of service exports —and consequently service employment— through the Rybzyinski eﬀect,
together with a contraction in the production of manufacturing.4
2.2.2 Labor market institutions.
Gordon (1997) suggests that several service industries intensive in low skill labour might
be relatively underdeveloped in continental Europe where the wage distribution is rela-
3See Diaz Fuentes (1999) and the references therein.
4A related literature, beyond the scope of this paper, is concerned with the eﬀects of trade with
developing countries on the recent trend of deindustrialization observed in the developed economies. See
Saeger (1997) and Rowthorn and Ramaswamy (1999).
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laws. A similar argument is raised by Piketty (1998). Indeed, as Gordon points out, the
casual European observer that travels to the other side of the Atlantic is surprised by
the quantity of service occupations (from shoe-shiners to the number of bar tenders in
a restaurant) that he observes there, which seem to be missing in most European coun-
tries. A similar negative role in the development of the service sector might be played by
unemployment beneﬁts if these institutions eﬀectively compress the wage structure by
raising reservation wages. Finally, institutions that hinder the reallocation of employ-
ment such as Employment Protection Legislation might, at least temporarily, obstruct
the expansion of dynamic service sectors.
2.2.3 Product Market Regulations
With regards to product market institutions, Messina (2003) shows that barriers to
entry raised by economy-wide product market regulations obstruct the natural pattern
of structural change, reducing the service employment share. This general equilibrium
eﬀect might be reinforced to the extent that some of these regulations are concentrated
on service sub-sectors (e.g. zoning laws or shop opening hours aﬀecting the distribution
sector).
2.2.4 Exogenous shifts of internal demand.
Some authors stress the importance of exogenous demand shifts in explaining cross-
country diﬀerences in the development of service industries. OECD (2000) highlights
the importance of the secular incorporation of female workers into the labour force as a
possible source of service employment growth.5 Thus, cultural diﬀerences aﬀecting female
labour market participation could be behind the diﬀerences in the development of the
service sector. Similarly, some aspects in the process of tertiarization like the expansion
of leisure services are typical of urban cultures, and therefore closely associated with the
process of urbanization. The degree of investment might also aﬀect the sectoral allocation
of labour across countries, if investment is intensive in manufacturing goods as suggested
by Rowthorn and Ramaswamy (1999). Finally, governments are not only consumers
but also important suppliers of services. If private and public services were perfectly
substitutable, the sectoral allocation of resources might be unaﬀected by diﬀerences
across countries in the size of the public sector. However, there are some services such
as defense, justice, public administration and to some extent health care where this
substitutability is clearly limited. Moreover, ineﬃciencies in the public sector might be
5However, there is an important risk of reverse causality in this case. It might well be the case that
the increasing dynamism of service industries in developed economies encouraged the incorporation of
women to the labor force.
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private provision are closely substitutes. Thus, a positive eﬀe c to ft h es i z eo ft h ep u b l i c
sector in the determination of the service employment share is expected.
3 Methodology and the Data
3.1 Empirical Methodology
Let  be the labour engaged in service activities as a share of total employment in period
 and country . A reduced-form equation explaining the service employment share is
speciﬁed as follows:
 =  +  +  + 	 for  =1 
2 and  =1 
2
 (1)
where  is a constant and 	 is the error term.  are a set of time-varying control
variables and  is a time-invariant institutional indicator.
The ﬁrst set of estimates presented below controls for country speciﬁc unobservable
heterogeneity. Random eﬀect estimators exploit both the between and within country
variation in the data estimating eq. (1) by feasible GLS. Thus, it is assumed that the
error term 	 in (1) can be decomposed as
	 =  +  (2)
where  denotes time-invariant country speciﬁc characteristics and  is the usual error






 The random eﬀect estimation treats the country speciﬁce ﬀects
() as random. The main disadvantage of this approach is that it requires the strong
assumption of absence of correlation between the country speciﬁc characteristics and the
set of covariates included in the regression. If this assumption is violated, the random
eﬀect estimators are inconsistent. Thus, as a robustness check this assumption is relaxed
in a second set of regressions. Following Mundalk (1978), the orthogonality condition can
be relaxed assuming that the country unobservable characteristics are a linear function
of the average over time of the covariates. This amounts to rewriting  in (2) as
 = 0 + ¯ 1 +  (3)
where ¯  is the individual mean of the time-varying covariates and  is an unobservable
component which is assumed to be uncorrelated with the . Collapsing (3) into (2)
and substituting into (1) the resulting speciﬁcation becomes
 = 0 +  + ¯ 1 +  +  +  for  =1 
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covariates are forced to become closer to the ﬁxed aﬀect coeﬃcients. Therefore, the
orthogonality condition imposed by the random eﬀects assumption is more likely to be
met.
3.2 The data
The data set covers the period 1970-1998 for a maximum of 27 OECD countries depend-
i n go ne a c hs p e c i ﬁcation. Five year averages are constructed to minimize the impact
of short frequency ﬂuctuations which are not the focus of this medium term analysis.6
The panel is slightly unbalanced, with 6 observations per country in most cases. Table
1 presents the main characteristics of the data. In the following, some of the variables
included in the regression analysis are discussed.7
Income elasticity of demand and the productivity gap.G D P p e r c a p i t a m e a s u r e d
i nt h o u s a n d so fd o l l a r sa n dP P Pe x c h a n g er a t e si si n t r o d u c e di na l lt h er e g r e s s i o n st o
control for the secular increase in the service employment share associated with demand
and supply factors. GDP per capita squared is also introduced in order to capture non
linearities in the relationship between both variables as those suggested by Figure 1. The
use of PPP exchange rates avoids distortions due to large exchange rate ﬂuctuations.
However, even if technological transfers are commonplace and presumably technol-
ogy ﬂows are faster today than ever, if imitation is costly (Barro and Sala i Martin,
1997) or countries raise barriers to technology adoption (Parente and Prescott, 1994)
technology diﬀusion might be slower, and technological diﬀerences might be found even
across countries with similar income per capita. Thus, in order to control for this factor
and have a direct test for the service productivity gap, the ratio of manufacturing to
service labour productivity is included in the regressions.8
Exogenous demand shifts. Government consumption as a percentage of GDP ac-
counts for the size of the pubic sector. The urbanization rate (measured as the share
of urban population in the total) accounts for exogenous demand shifts associated with
the development of urban cultures, while the investment rate (measured as Gross ﬁxed
investment over GDP) accounts for possible composition eﬀects of investment.
Labor market institutions. The OECD (1997) ﬁnds that more coordinated wage bar-
gaining systems are associated with a relatively more compressed wage structure. Thus,
6This is also justiﬁed by the slow moving nature of institutions. See for instance, Blanchard and
Wolfers (2000). The data are collapsed in ﬁve periods covering ﬁve-year intervals: 1970-1974, 1975-1979,
1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994 and one period of four years: 1995-1998.
7For precise deﬁnitions and sources see the data Appendix
8Productivity is measured as output per worker. A measure of hours worked in both sectors would
be preferable, since diﬀerent trends in part-time (probably more intense within the service sector) will
contaminate the measure of relative productivities. Unfortunately, a long series of hours worked per
sector for this large set of countries is not available.
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cluded in the regressions as proxies for union bargaining power. Unemployment beneﬁts
could also raise wage ﬂoors by increasing the reservation wage of labour market par-
ticipants. The replacement rate, measured as the percentage of unemployment beneﬁts
with respect to the previous wage, controls for the generosity of passive labour market
policies. Alternatively, an indicator of wage compression (the ratio of the 50th to the
10th decile of the wage distribution) is considered in an attempt to control for the eﬀects
of wage ﬂoors on the development of service employment. An indicator of employment
protection legislation controls for adjustment costs in the labour market.
Product market regulations. An index of administrative burdens to the creation of
new ﬁrms controls for the eﬀects of barriers to entry in the growth of service employment.
This indicator refers to barriers to entry which are not only aﬀecting the service sector
but the whole economy, ranking the countries under study in a scale from 0 to 6 according
to the increasing strictness of the regulations.
Trade specialization. The percentage of ores, fuel and raw materials exports with
respect to GDP accounts for natural resources availability. Similarly, the ratio of services
to manufacturing trade balances controls for direct trade specialization. Finally, in order
to control for possible sources of comparative advantage due to diﬀerences in human
capital, the percentage in the population holding a secondary school degree is included
in the regressions.
Since the availability of data for speciﬁc countries and periods varies importantly de-
pending on the control variable considered, the set of controls is divided into two groups.
A core set of covariates is included in every speciﬁcation according to data availability
and their relative importance in explaining service employment. This basic speciﬁcation
includes GDP per capita, GDP per capita squared, administrative regulations, gross
domestic ﬁxed investment over GDP and the degree of urbanization. The remaining
variables discussed above are introduced in separate speciﬁcations.
4 Empirical Results
Table 2 presents the results from the random eﬀects estimations following eq. (1) and
T a b l e3p r e s e n t st h es a m es p e c i ﬁcations including time dummies.9 In all speciﬁcations,
9Panel unit root tests following the methodology proposed Maddala and Wu (1999) were implemented.
This is a simple Fisher type test that combines information of unit root test for each separate cross-
section. For all variables except GDP per capita, when no trend is included in the regression the null
of unit root was rejected within our 5 year averages panel. The results were qualitatively the same
using Philips-Perron or Augmented Dickey Fuller tests for each of the cross-sectional units .T h es a m e
test on the residuals of each speciﬁcation rejected the null, suggesting the hypothesis of non-spurious
regression and the appropriateness of stationary panel data estimation techniques. However, note that
these results should be read very cautiously, given the reduced size of  (6 in most cases) in the panel.
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very similar when period dummies are dropped from the regression. Thus, I will con-
centrate in the text on the discussion of the regressions without time dummies (Table
2) and will only refer to the speciﬁcation with time dummies when they alter the re-
sults. First note the Breusch-Pagan tests at the bottom of the table. In all cases, the
absence of individual country eﬀects is rejected. Similarly, the Hausman tests suggest
that the hypothesis of consistency of the random eﬀects estimates cannot be rejected
in all the speciﬁcations that include the share of public sector consumption but exclude
time dummies (columns 2 to 7 in Table 2)
Starting with the basic speciﬁcation (Column 1), the ﬁrst aspect worth noticing is
the conﬁrmation of the positive association between the service employment share and
GDP per capita. This relationship has been widely documented in the past (see, for
example, Maddison, 1980) and was recently conﬁrmed by OECD (2000). The negative
s i g no nt h es q u a r eo fG D Pp e rh e a dp o i n t st oan o nl i n e a rr e l a t i o nb e t w e e ni n c o m e
per capita and the service employment share, suggesting a turning point when income
per capita reaches 19,111$. This is below the ﬁgures of the richest countries in the last
period of the sample, implying that mature economies have entered a saturation point
in the expansion of service employment. Indeed, there is a clear slowdown in the growth
of the service employment share of the richest countries throughout the sample period.
The counterpart of this deceleration, is a pattern of absolute convergence in the service
employment share of OECD countries. This is illustrated in Figure 3, which shows a
strong negative correlation (-.86) across countries between the average annual growth
rate of the service employment share from 1970 to 1996 and the service employment
share in 1970.
With reference to the role of some of the variables accounting for exogenous demand
s h i f t s ,t h ei n d i c a t o ro fu r b a n i z a t i o ni ss i g n i ﬁcant and signed as expected. According to
the estimate of Column 1, a percentage point increase in the population living in urban
areas would result in a 0.32 percentage points expansion of the service employment share.
On the contrary, countries with a larger investment rate present a lower share of service
employment. This is in line with the positive role of investment in the manufacturing
employment share regressions found by Rowthorn and Ramaswamy (1999), and suggests
that demand for investment is biased towards manufacturing goods. However, this eﬀect
becomes non-signiﬁcant in 3 out of the 7 speciﬁcations when period dummies are included
in the regressions.
The ﬁnal regressor included in the core set of control variables is the indicator of
administrative regulations. The negative and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect supports the
view that barriers to the creation of new ﬁrms have an asymmetric eﬀect in the economy,
by hindering the expansion of dynamic sectors within the service industries (Messina,
15
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if administrative regulations for the creation of new ﬁrms in a country like Italy become as
“market friendly” as in Canada, the service employment share in the European country
would increase by more than 7 percentage points.10 The magnitude of the eﬀect is
s o m e w h a tl o w e ri nt h er e m a i n i n gs p e c i ﬁcations, but negative and statistically signiﬁcant
in all cases except for the last column, where the sample size is reduced importantly due
to the introduction of wage inequality as a regressor.
Column 2 introduces government consumption. Since a large fraction of government
consumption represents the wage bill and public employees are concentrated on the
service sector, there is a risk of artiﬁcially inﬂating the goodness of ﬁt in the regressions
when this indicator of the size of the public sector is included in the regressions. However,
the eﬀe c td oe sn o ts e e mt obep r e s e n ti nt h es a m p l e ,w i t ha na d j u s t e d2 of 0.86 both with
and without government consumption in the regressions (Columns 1 and 2).11 This might
be due to the fact that government consumption includes important expenditures not
directly related to the size of the labour force in the public sector (such as intermediate
consumption) but might also reﬂect the crowding out of private sector employment noted
above. Moreover, introducing the share of public consumption proved important for
the consistency of the estimators according to the Hausman test. Thus, this control is
included in the remaining speciﬁcations. Accordingly, there is a clear positive association
between the share of government consumption in GDP and the service employment share.
This estimate, consistent with the positive association between the service employment
share and the size of the welfare state found in OECD (2000), is very stable across all
speciﬁcations and always statistically signiﬁcant.
The results of the extended speciﬁcations are presented in Columns 3 to 7. According
to Column 3, the productivity diﬀerential between manufacturing and services remains an
important factor in explaining the expansion of service employment even after controlling
for income per capita, supporting Baumol’s hypothesis. Moreover, even after controlling
for the service productivity gap the positive sign of GDP per capita remains highly
signiﬁcant, suggesting that demand factors cannot be disregarded as a source of service
employment expansion.
The female employment share in Column 4 presents a positive (although non-signiﬁcant)
aﬀect on the service employment share. Similarly, evidence in Columns 5 shows that
trade specialization has a limited role in explaining the cross-country developments of
10This is just illustrative to give an idea of the magnitude of the eﬀect. The Lucas critique would
apply in such an event, rendering diﬃcult to draw conclusions for deregulation policies from the analysis
presented here.
11The share of current government expenditures in GDP is an alternative indicator commonly used in
the literature to proxy for the size of the public sector. Results with this indicator, not reported in the
text, do not diﬀer qualitatively with respect to those with government consumption.
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Dutch-disease hypothesis, while the direct measures of trade specialization and secondary
education are also signed as expected. However, none of these estimates is statistically
signiﬁcant at the standard conﬁdence levels.12
The last two columns in the table concentrate on the role played in the development
of the service sector of several institutional aspects of the labour market. Dismissal
restrictions, as measured by the OECD indices of employment protection legislation
do not seem to aﬀect service employment, contrasting with the evidence presented for
a reduced sample in the OECD (2000).13 On the contrary, estimates in Column 6
indicate that the strength of union bargaining power, either when measured through
union density or through the degree of wage-setting co-ordination, play an important
role in the determination of service employment. According to these estimates, a 10
percentage points fall in the unionization rate, as happened within the sample period
in Australia for instance, would have resulted in an expansion of service employment
of 1 percentage point. This eﬀect is reduced when period dummies are introduced,
suggesting that the point estimate is capturing the eﬀect of the de-unionization trend
observed in most countries during the sample period. Regarding unemployment beneﬁts,
countries with more generous systems appear to have a larger service employment share, a
somewhat puzzling result given the likely role of these institutions in rasing reservation
wages. Finally, Column 7 presents an attempt to test directly for the role of wage
compression in the development of the service sector. The indicator of wage inequality
is signed as expected, suggesting that countries with more unequal wage distributions
tend to have larger service employment shares. However, possibly due to the limited
availability of information on the distribution of wages and the small sample at hand,
this eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant.
The next set of regressions, presented in Table 4, relax the random eﬀects assumption
following eq. (4) by assuming that the country eﬀects are a linear function of the average
of the covariates. In general, the results are in line with previous estimates, suggesting
the robustness of the random eﬀect estimates presented before. Thus, the analysis con-
ﬁrms the positive impact of GDP per capita, the productivity diﬀerential, government
consumption and the degree of urbanization on the service employment share. On the
contrary, the results suggest important institutional constraints to the development of
service employment. Barriers to the creation of new ﬁrms due to product market reg-
12Similar results were obtained with other indicators of human capital described in Barro and Lee
(2000) such as the average number of years of schooling in the population or the share of population
holding a tertiary degree.
13The evidence presented in the table refers to an indicator constucted ﬁrst by Blanchard and Wolfers
(2000) and then extended by Nickell and Nunziata (2000) which has a time dimension but refers to a
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are associated with a lower service employment share.
Table 5 presents disaggregated analysis of the determinants of employment shares
in 4 service branches: Wholesale and Retail Trade (Wholesale), Transport and Com-
munications (Transport), Social and Personal Services (Social) and Financial, Business
Services, Insurance and Real Estate activities (FIRE). It should be noted from the out-
set that this exercise does not intend to model the determinants of each of these service
branches separately. Instead, it aims to shed some light on the channels through which
the aggregate determinants uncovered in the previous analysis are altering the sectoral
distribution of employment. Thus, the analysis is conﬁned to those regressors that turned
out signiﬁcant in the speciﬁcation presented in Column 6 in the previous Tables. Looking
at particular service branches should also help us learn about the role of institutional
aspects in the determination of service employment. For instance, if union bargaining
power compress the wage structure hindering the expansion of low skilled jobs, the eﬀects
of union density and more centralized wage bargaining systems should fall more than
proportionally in those sectors that are intensive in low skilled labour such as Wholesale
and Retail Trade. Similarly, if entry regulations obstruct the creation of employment,
their eﬀects should be more evident in rapid growing sectors such as Financial and Busi-
ness Services, Social and Personal Services and to a lesser extent Wholesale and Retail
Trade.14
Regarding structural factors, the driving forces behind the expansion of service sub-
branches are quite similar to those explaining the aggregate increase of the service em-
ployment share. Notably, income per capita presents a positive impact on the expansion
of services in all branches except Transports and Communications, while the size of the
public sector and the degree of urbanization are positively associated with all service
sub-branches except Financial and Business services. With respect to institutional fac-
tors, as expected administrative regulations have a negative impact in all sectors, but the
coeﬃcient is only signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in the case of Financial and Business
Services. Regarding the role of unions and wage-setting institutions, more unionized
countries with a higher degree of wage-setting co-ordination present a lower Wholesale
and Retail trade sector. The eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant, supporting the view that
these institutions are likely to obstruct the expansion of services intensive in low skilled
labour. However, a somewhat counter-intuitive result is the positive and statistically sig-
niﬁcant coeﬃcient of wage-setting co-ordination in the Transport and Communications
regression.
14However, in Social and Personal services there is an important role of public employment which does
not need to be aﬀected by entry regulations.
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March 2004considered in the previous speciﬁcations. Moreover, it disentangles the partial contribu-
tion of each variable in explaining the within and between country variation in the data,
by allowing for the following transformation
 =  +
¡
 − ¯ 
¢
 + ¯  +  + 	 for  =1 
2 and  =1 
2
 (5)
where  denotes for the set of time-varying explanatory variables and ¯  is the individ-
ual mean of the time-varying covariates. The rest of the variables are deﬁned as above.
In particular,  is a time-invariant indicator of administrative regulations aﬀecting the
creation of new ﬁrms. In this context, an analysis of covariance of equation (5) provides
estimates of the partial contribution of the regressors to the explanation of the evolution
of the service share over time (the vector of coeﬃcients ) and to the explanation of the
cross-country variability in the service employment share (the vector  and the coeﬃcient
). Note that each coeﬃcient should be read as the direct contribution of a regressor
to the explanation of the dependent variable taken the other regressors as given. Thus,
al o wp a r t i a l2 for a particular regressor does not necessarily imply that the variable
is not important for the determination of the service employment share, since its eﬀect
might be partially captured by the rest of the control variables. On the contrary, if the
explanatory variables were uncorrelated among each other, the sum of partial 2 would
be equal to the model 2.
Table 4 presents ANCOVA results of the determinants of the aggregate service em-
ployment share for the set of regressors which turned out consistently signiﬁcant in the
previous speciﬁcations. According to Column 1, there is a clear dominance of GDP per
capita in explaining both the within and between variability of the service employment
share, accounting for more than 25 per cent of the variance of the dependent variable.
The degree of urbanization plays a prominent role in explaining cross-country diﬀer-
ences, while the generalized increase in government consumption throughout the sample
period explains about 1.1 of the variation over time of the service employment share.
Finally, the results conﬁrm the non-negligible eﬀect of administrative regulations on the
creation of new ﬁrms in explaining the relative underdevelopment of service employment
in some countries, accounting for more than 4 per cent of the cross-sectional variance in
the data. Column 2 includes the ratio of manufacturing to services productivity in the
regression. Note the sharp decline in the partial 2 of the remaining variables, suggesting
a considerable amount of colinearity between this variable and the rest of the regressors,
which renders diﬃcult to draw deﬁnitive conclusions about its predictive power. The
last column includes union density, wage-setting co-ordination and the replacement rate.
In all cases, the main eﬀects of institutions fall on the cross-country variation of the
service employment share. However, the evolution over time of union density rates has
also aﬀected signiﬁcantly the recent evolution of service employment in this sample of
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Table 6 aims to shed some light on the explanatory power of each of the regressors
OECD countries.5 Conclusions
The expansion of service employment is unambiguously associated with the growth of
living standards in modern economies. However, there are some countries which seem to
be lagging behind in the process of tertiarization of employment. This paper documents
the main regularities in the expansion of service employment within OECD countries
in the period 1970-1998 and explores the likely sources of divergence in the service
employment share across this relatively homogeneous group of countries. The paper
places a special emphasis on the role that institutional aspects may play in hampering
or stimulating the growth of service employment.
According to the panel regressions presented in the text, which are robust to a variety
of speciﬁcations, the analysis conﬁrms the positive impact of GDP per capita on the
service employment share, although it also suggests that the richest countries in the
sample might have reached a saturation level in the expansion of the demand for services.
Similarly, the increasing size of the public sector and progressive urbanization of the
population within the period of analysis appear as prominent factors in the expansion
o ft h er e l a t i v es i z eo ft h es e r v i c es e c t o r .
The results also suggest important institutional constraints to the development of
service employment. Stringent barriers to the creation of new ﬁrms due to administrative
burdens to business startups and more unionized and coordinated wage-setting structures
within a country are associated with a lower service employment share. Regarding
product market regulations, this result is in line with theoretical insights that suggest
that product market regulations hinder the development of sectors whose demand is
income elastic, such as Financial and Business Services or Social and Personal Services.
This is partially supported in an empirical analysis of the determinants of four service
branches. The disaggregated analysis also uncovers that the main negative eﬀects of
unions and coordinated wage-setting structures falls on Retail and Wholesale Trade.
Taking into account that this sector is intensive in low skill labour, this can be read as
supportive evidence that more unionized labour markets where bargaining takes place
at a very centralized or coordinated level are cutting back low skilled jobs.
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Deﬁnition of the Variables and Data Sources
Source: OECD Statistical Compendium (2001)
• Service Employment Share: Civilian service employment share in total civilian
employment. Services are deﬁned as ISIC Major Divisions 6 to 9, therefore includ-
ing ISIC 6: wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels, ISIC 7: transport,
storage and communication, ISIC 8: ﬁnancing, insurance, real estate, and business
services and ISIC 9: community, social and personal services.
• Wholesale and retail employment share: ISIC 6 employment/total civilian employ-
ment
• Transport and Communications employment share: ISIC 7 employment/total civil-
ian employment
• FIRE employment share: ISIC 8 employment/total civilian employment
• Community services employment share: ISIC 9 employment/total civilian employ-
ment
• GDP per capita: GDP per head at current prices and PPP exchange rates.
• Gov. Cons.: Government consumption expenditure over GDP.
• Female Emplo.: Female civilian employment as a share of total civilian employ-
ment.
• Productivity Diﬀ.: Manufacturing labour productivity/Services labour productiv-
ity. Labor productivity is deﬁned as sectoral GDP at constant prices/Total Em-
ployment.
• Tax wedge: Average tax burden as a percentage of GDP.
• Trade ratio. Manufacturing trade balance over services trade balance.
Source: World Development Indicators (2001)
• Investment: Gross domestic ﬁxed investment over GDP.
• Urbanization: Urban population as percentage of total population.
• Natural Res. Exp.. Natural resources exports as percentage of GDP. Natural
resources include fuels, ores, metal and raw material exports.
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March 2004• Administrative Reg. Administrative regulations to business startups. This indi-
cator illustrates the relative stringency of product market regulations in OECD
countries for a point in time referring to the end of the 1990s, ranking countries
from 0 to 6 according to increasing stringency of the regulatory standards. The
variable included in the regression is constructed under the assumption of con-
stancy of this institutions in the period of analysis.
Source: OECD DEELSEA Earnings Structure Database
• Wage ineq.: Ratio of the 50th to the 10th percentile of the earnings distribution.
Generally, they refer to gross earnings rations, except for France. They normally
refer to full-time full-year earnings, except for Austria, Denmark and Norway, which
include all employees. Earnings are deﬁned on an annual basis in Canada, Finland,
France, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland; monthly in Austria, the
Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Korea and Poland; weekly in
Australia, Belgium, Ireland, New Zealand, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the
United States; hourly in Norway.
Source: Nickell and Nunziata (2001). Labour Market Institutions database
• EPL: Employment protection legislation for regular and temporary contracts.
• Union Density: Net (gross minus retired and unemployed members) union density
rate
• Co-ordination: Wage-setting co-ordination. Index with range {1,3} increasing in
the degree of co-ordination
• Replacement Rt.: Average unemployment beneﬁt received in the ﬁrst year of un-
employment as a fraction of average earnings before taxes.
Source: Barro and Lee (2000)
• Secondary Edu.: Percentage of secondary school completed in total population.
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Source: Nicoletti et al. (1999)Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean St. Dv. Min. Max. N.Ob. N.C.
Service Employment Share 56.04 11.53 20.89 73.84 143 27
GDP per Capita 11.03 6.57 0.83 27.96 143 27
Administrative Reg. 1.99 0.88 0.50 3.90 143 27
Gov. Cons. 16.75 4.72 7.56 29.05 143 27
Investment 22.50 4.59 13.68 36.77 143 27
Urbanization 70.87 14.79 26.60 97.00 143 27
Productivity Diﬀ. 0.70 0.22 0.39 1.42 117 23
Female Emplo. 50.33 12.58 20.13 77.66 134 27
Secundary Edu. 20.52 11.58 3.80 47.50 90 24
Trade Ratio 100.6 36.38 38.13 264.0 90 24
Natural Res. Exp. 3.70 3.91 0.17 18.73 90 24
EPL 1.07 0.57 0.10 2.00 114 20
Union Density 43.83 19.43 9.00 90.0 114 20
Co-ordination 2.09 0.59 1.00 3.00 114 20
Replacement Rt. 0.43 0.18 0.02 0.77 114 20
Wage ineq. 1.69 0.24 1.31 2.41 76 23
Note: For the core set of regressors (GDP per capita, Administrative Regulations, Government
Consumption, Fixed Investment and the Urbanization Rate) the summary statistics refer to the
sample included in the basic speciﬁcation. The summary statistics for the other variables refer
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March 2004Table 2: The Determinants of Service Employment. 1970-1998. Random Eﬀects
Dependent Variable: Service Employment Share
M o d e l : 1234567
Constant 31.66‡ 24.24‡ 22.29‡ 24.86‡ 25.60‡ 34.31‡ 32.72‡
(3.31) (4.05) (4.64) (5.37) (4.80) (5.98) (8.63)
GDP per capita 1.72‡ 1.55‡ 1.54‡ 1.52‡ 2.19‡ 1.36‡ 1.64‡
(0.12) (0.13) (0.17) (0.15) (0.21) (0.12) (0.16)
(GDP per capita)2 -0.03‡ -0.03‡ -0.03‡ -0.03‡ -0.04‡ -0.02‡ -0.03‡
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Admin. Reg. -3.51‡ -2.61‡ -2.30‡ -2.59‡ -2.04‡ -2.09† -1.53
(0.96) (1.03) (1.18) (1.06) (0.97) (1.25) (1.06)
Investment -0.23‡ -0.17‡ -0.09 -0.17† -0.21‡ -0.20‡ -0.40‡
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
Urbanization 0.32‡ 0.31‡ 0.22‡ 0.29‡ 0.16‡ 0.25‡ 0.27‡
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Gov. Cons. 0.36‡ 0.39‡ 0.37‡ 0.50‡ 0.50‡ 0.10
(0.12) (0.14) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15)




























0.00‡ 0.37 0.59 0.54 0.21 0.21 0.59
2 0.86 0.86 0.89 0.82 0.87 0.83 0.80
Number Obs. 143 143 117 134 90 114 76
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March 2004Table 3: Random Eﬀects Including Time Dummies
Dependent Variable: Service Employment Share
M o d e l : 1234567
Constant 32.98‡ 24.67‡ 20.14‡ 22.62‡ 32.75‡ 40.90‡ 30.90‡
(4.36) (4.99) (5.29) (5.77) (6.24) (6.26) (9.07)
GDP per capita 1.90‡ 1.73‡ 2.12‡ 1.93‡ 1.88‡ 0.74‡ 1.70‡
(0.25) (0.24) (0.31) (0.28) (0.29) (0.31) (0.35)
(GDP per capita)2 -0.04‡ -0.04‡ -0.05‡ -0.04‡ -0.04‡ -0.02‡ -0.04‡
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Admin. Reg. -3.50‡ -2.41‡ -2.12‡ -2.29‡ -2.31‡ -2.16‡ -1.05
(0.89) (0.95) (0.96) (0.99) (1.11) (1.11) (1.20)
Investment -0.22‡ -0.15† -0.12 -0.16 -0.20‡ -0.06 -0.38‡
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09)
Urbanization 0.30‡ 0.28‡ 0.21‡ 0.25‡ 0.13‡ 0.26‡ 0.23‡
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Gov. Cons. 0.43‡ 0.39‡ 0.45‡ 0.60‡ 0.50‡ 0.25
(0.12) (0.14) (0.12) (0.13) (0.11) (0.16)




























0.00‡ 0.00‡ 0.00‡ 0.00‡ 0.00‡ 0.00‡ 0.00‡
2 0.86 0.86 0.89 0.83 0.82 0.79 0.76
N. obs: 143 143 117 134 90 114 76
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March 2004Table 4: The determinants of Service Employment. 1970-1998. Mundalk Speciﬁcation
Dependent Variable: Service Employment Share
M o d e l : 1234567
Constant 30.41‡ 30.97‡ 15.90‡ 34.88‡ 27.77‡ 42.08† 39.28‡
(9.48) (10.54) (14.45) (9.52) (8.77) (19.64) (14.38)
GDP per capita 1.66‡ 1.47‡ 1.58‡ 1.43‡ 2.06‡ 1.27‡ 1.59‡
(0.14) (0.14) (0.19) (0.16) (0.23) (0.12) (0.17)
(GDP per capita)2 -0.03‡ -0.03‡ -0.04‡ -0.03‡ -0.04‡ -0.02‡ -0.03‡
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Admin.. Reg. -3.73‡ -3.79‡ -2.75‡ -3.77‡ -2.63‡ -2.50 -2.89†
(1.12) (1.22) (1.50) (1.26) (1.13) (1.74) (1.25)
Investment -0.29‡ -0.20‡ -0.04 -0.18‡ -0.23‡ -0.20‡ -0.47‡
(0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10)
Urbanization 0.36‡ 0.34‡ 0.16† 0.31‡ 0.09 0.49‡ 0.36‡
(0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.10) (0.09) (0.14) (0.09)
Gov. Cons. 0.44‡ 0.46‡ 0.47‡ 0.80‡ 0.50‡ 0.22‡
(0.13) (0.16) (0.14) (0.17) (0.14) (0.19)




















2 0.89 0.89 0.91 0.87 0.92 0.90 0.83
N. obs: 143 143 117 134 90 114 76
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. ‡ and † denote statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% and 10%
levels respectively. All the regressions include (not reported in the table) the cross-sectional
average of the time variant covariates.
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March 2004Table 5: Institutions and Structural Factors on Employment Shares of Service Branches
in OECD Countries. 1970-1998
Model : 1 2 3 4
Depvar: Wholesale Transport Social FIRE
Constant 18.567‡ 1.309 11.40‡ 5.186†
(3.654) (1.465) (4.863) (2.857)
GDP per capita 0.324‡ -0.051 0.616‡ 0.392‡
(0.087) (0.034) (0.120) (0.072)
(GDP per capita)2 -0.007‡ 0.001 -0.014‡ -0.004
(0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002)
Gov. Consumption 0.108 0.087‡ 0.310‡ 0.001
(0.089) (0.035) (0.122) (0.072)
Urbanization 0.028 0.030‡ 0.130‡ 0.033
(0.034) (0.014) (0.044) (0.025)
Investment 0.020 0.037 -0.238‡ -0.038
(0.058) (0.023) (0.079) (0.046)
Administrative. Reg. -0.920 -0.107 -0.423 -1.061‡
(0.668) (0.271) (0.864) (0.498)
Union Density -0.097‡ 0.003 0.021 -0.029‡
(0.017) (0.007) (0.023) (0.014)
Co-ordination -0.667‡ 0.462‡ -0.534 -0.166
(0.314) (0.124) (0.435) (0.251)
Replacement Rt. -0.016 0.142 3.568‡ 0.853




0.01‡ 0.99 0.38 0.69
N. obs: 110 110 110 102
R2 0.475 0.401 0.746 0.731
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March 2004Table 6: Analysis of Covariance. Cross-country Determinants of Service Employment
Share in OECD Countries. 1970-1998
(1) (2) (3)
Par R2 PrF Par R2 PrF Par R2 PrF
Within-Country Variation
GDP per capita 10.52 (0.00) 2.370 (0.00) 8.446 (0.00)
Government Cons. 1.129 (0.00) 1.118 (0.00) 1.081 (0.00)
Urbanization 1.355 (0.00) 0.810 (0.00) 0.532 (0.01)
Productivity Diﬀ. -- 0.215 (0.09) --
UnionDensity ---- 0.479 (0.02)
Co-ordination ---- 0.110 (0.25)
Replacement Rt. ---- 0.016 (0.66)
Cross-Country Variation
Administrative Reg. 4.022 (0.00) 1.811 (0.00) 4.336 (0.00)
GDP per capita 14.85 (0.00) 7.664 (0.00) 12.19 (0.00)
Government Cons. 0.022 (0.57) 0.033 (0.51) 0.581 (0.01)
Urbanization 6.194 (0.00) 2.558 (0.00) 10.18 (0.00)
Productivity Diﬀ. -- 1.641 (0.00) --
UnionDensity ---- 1.366 (0.00)
Co-ordination ---- 0.845 (0.00)
Replacement Rt. ---- 2.831 (0.00)
Overall Fit 90.09 (0.00) 91.42 (0.00) 91.26 (0.00)
Note: Pr  F is the probability of accpeting the null of  =0
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•Sources: Real GDP per capita: 1870-1960 from Maddison (1980) and 1970-1990 from Penn World Table 5.6,
converted to 1970 U.S dollars using the GDP deflator from the OECD Statistical Compendium (1999).
•Service Share of Employment: 1870-1960 from Maddison (1980) and 1970-1990 from OECD (1999).
•Countries included: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, The
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, U.K and the United States.
Figure 1: Service Employment and GDP per Capita. 14 OECD Countries. 1870-1990
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Figure 3: Convergence in the Service Employment Share. OECD Countries
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